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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge: 
 In the midst of Sierra Leone’s catastrophic civil war, 
Musa Sesay was forced to provide assistance to a terrorist 
group while facing regular beatings and the barrel of a gun.  
He resisted when possible and escaped when he could.  In 
short, he was himself a victim of terrorist violence, and, to the 
extent he provided any aid to the group, he did so under 
duress.  However, because the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(“BIA”) concluded that there was no duress exception to the 
bar on asylum or withholding of removal for aliens who 
3 
provide material support to terrorist groups, it found him 
ineligible for relief. 
 Sesay now petitions for review of the BIA’s order 
denying his application for asylum and ordering him removed 
from the United States, and we must decide for the first time 
whether there is a duress exception to the material support 
bar.  While we are sympathetic to Sesay’s plight, long-
standing canons of statutory construction and the opinions of 
our sister Circuits on this issue convince us that there is no 
such exception.  Thus, we will deny the petition for review. 
I. Facts1 
The facts relevant here date back to early 2001, the 
eleventh year of what is widely recognized as a brutal civil 
war in Sierra Leone.2  Amid the humanitarian catastrophe, 
                                              
 1 We take our facts from the final order of the BIA, 
and to the extent the BIA relied upon it, the Immigration 
Judge’s decision.  See Gonzalez-Posadas v. Att’y Gen., 781 
F.3d 677, 684 n.5 (3d Cir. 2015).  
 2 As described by a contemporaneous State 
Department report, the war was replete with a ghastly array of 
atrocities against civilians, including the amputation of ears, 
noses, hands, arms, and legs of noncombatants; the use of 
rape as a terror tactic; the abduction and forced conscription 
of children into service as soldiers and sexual slaves; the 
massacre of fleeing civilians; and the coercion of citizens 
under penalty of mutilation or death to commit atrocities 
themselves.  See U.S. Dep’t of State, 1999 Country Reports 
on Human Rights Practices: Sierra Leone (2000), available at 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/270.htm, A.R. 228-
4 
and at a time when a fragile peace accord had largely failed, 
Sesay lived with his family in the country’s capital, Freetown.  
One night in early 2001, three rebels from the Revolutionary 
United Front (“RUF”) forcibly entered Sesay’s home and 
demanded he join the RUF.  When he refused, and while his 
parents pleaded for his safety, the rebels blindfolded him and 
took him away.  Upon arriving at a windowless room, the 
rebels again demanded he join the RUF, again beat him when 
he said no, and imprisoned him.  Over approximately the next 
month, the rebels periodically asked whether he was ready to 
join the RUF.  Each time, he refused.  And each time, they 
beat him in response.   
 After about one month of imprisonment, the rebels 
moved Sesay to a RUF encampment where he witnessed 
some captives being executed and saw others with missing 
body parts.  While there, the rebels tried to train him to use a 
machine gun.  Again, he refused.  Because Sesay was 
untrained in weaponry, the rebels forced him instead to 
provide menial assistance.  Specifically, on approximately 
five occasions, he entered the Sierra Leone jungle with the 
rebels during active fighting.  RUF trucks, however, had 
trouble traversing the jungle terrain.  As a result, the rebels 
forced Sesay and others to carry their weapons, ammunition, 
drinking water, and food, and to load and unload these 
                                                                                                     
29, 233, 240.  By the time the eleven-year-long war ended in 
2002, as many as two million citizens were displaced.  See 
Mohammed Fofana, Sierra Leone: Political Rivalry Spills 
over into Street Violence, Inter Press Service, August 18, 
2008, A.R. 318. 
 
5 
provisions from the trucks.  Sesay complied under 
supervision of an armed guard. 
 After about one month in the encampment, Sesay used 
the chaos of war to his advantage.  When Guinean aircraft 
approached the encampment, frightening the rebels, Sesay 
escaped, fleeing to neighboring Guinea, and eventually, 
Gambia.  In May 2001, he entered the United States and soon 
thereafter applied for asylum.  Except for a permitted trip to 
visit his ill mother, he has been in the United States ever 
since.  In December 2009, he was served with a Notice to 
Appear, and proceedings before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) 
followed. 
II. Legal Standards and Procedural History  
 Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 
an alien seeking asylum must demonstrate either (i) proof of 
past persecution, or (ii) a well-founded fear of future 
persecution in his home country “on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); see Camara v. 
Att’y Gen., 580 F.3d 196, 201-02 (3d Cir. 2009).  “Although 
these two roads to asylum are doctrinally distinct from one 
another, they intersect.”  Camara, 580 F.3d at 202.  
Specifically, a well-founded fear of future persecution, 
without more, entitles an applicant to asylum.  Id.  But a 
“demonstration of past persecution can be rebutted by the 
government if the government ‘establishes by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the applicant could 
reasonably avoid persecution by relocating to another part of 
his or her country or that conditions in the applicant’s country 
have changed so as to make his or her fear no longer 
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reasonable.’”  Id. (quoting Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 
587, 592 n.3 (3d Cir. 2003)). 
 An application for withholding of removal is reviewed 
under a more stringent standard.  In that case, an alien “must 
establish a clear probability, that is, that it is more likely than 
not that [his] life or freedom would be threatened if returned 
to [his] country” because of his protected class.  Kaita v. Att’y 
Gen., 522 F.3d 288, 296 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 Regardless of whether an alien demonstrates he is 
eligible for relief, he will be deemed inadmissible and 
ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal if he has 
engaged in terrorist activities, including the provision of 
material support for terrorist groups.  8 U.S.C. §§ 
1158(b)(2)(A)(v), 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I), 1231(b)(3)(B), 
1227(a)(4)(B). 
A. Decision of the Immigration Judge 
 After conducting a hearing and considering evidence, 
the IJ found Sesay credible and concluded that he was a 
victim of past persecution on account of his membership in a 
particular social group, i.e., those who vocally opposed forced 
conscription into the RUF.  As a result, he was entitled to a 
rebuttable presumption of future persecution.  See Camara, 
580 F.3d at 202.  The IJ found, however, that the Government 
rebutted this presumption by demonstrating that in the years 
since Sesay fled, the RUF disbanded, and reconciliation in 
Sierra Leone generally has been successful.  Accordingly, 
with the presumption of future persecution rebutted, the IJ 
found Sesay ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal.   
7 
 In the alternative, the IJ also found Sesay ineligible for 
asylum and withholding of removal because he provided 
material support to the RUF, the same group that beat him, 
imprisoned him, and forced him to provide menial labor 
under threat of death.  To reach this determination, the IJ 
found that the RUF was an unclassified, or Tier III, terrorist 
organization.3  Then, citing our holdings in McAllister v. 
Attorney General, 444 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 2006), and Singh-
Kaur v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2004), the IJ found 
that Sesay’s carrying of weapons, ammunition, food, and 
water for the RUF constituted material support.  Finally, the 
IJ conducted a statutory analysis of the INA and concluded 
that it does not contain a duress exception to the material 
support bar.  The fact that Sesay’s actions were involuntary, 
the IJ found, was irrelevant.     
B. Proceedings before the BIA 
 In a single-member, non-precedential opinion, the BIA 
affirmed the IJ’s decision and dismissed Sesay’s appeal.  The 
                                              
3 A Tier III terrorist organization is defined as a “group 
of two or more individuals, whether organized or not, which 
engages in, or has a subgroup which engages in, [terrorist 
activities.]”  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III).  The parties 
agree that the RUF was a Tier III terrorist organization during 
the relevant time period and that Sesay understood this for 
purposes of the Act.  After Sesay left Sierra Leone, the RUF 
was designated as a Tier II terrorist organization.  See 
Designation of 39 “Terrorist Organizations” Under the 
“PATRIOT USA Act,” 66 Fed. Reg. 63620-01 (Dec. 7, 
2001).  The distinction between these two categories is not 
material to our disposition here. 
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BIA did not consider whether Sesay had a well-founded fear 
of future persecution.  Instead, it agreed with the IJ that 
Sesay’s actions constituted material support for terrorism and 
that there was no duress exception. 
 Sesay now petitions for review of the BIA decision.  
The parties agree that two issues are presented: whether the 
record supports that Sesay provided material support for 
terrorism, and if so, whether there is a duress exception to the 
material support bar. 
III. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
We have jurisdiction to review final orders of the BIA 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  Where, as here, the BIA 
“relie[d] on an IJ’s legal conclusions and findings of fact, we 
review the IJ’s decision and the Board’s decision.”  Gonzalez-
Posadas, 781 F.3d at 684 n.5.  In doing so, we “accept factual 
findings if supported by substantial evidence,” a deferential 
standard under which we “uphold the agency’s determination 
unless the evidence would compel any reasonable fact finder 
to reach a contrary result.”  Id.4   
                                              
4 The BIA adopted, or at minimum, expressed no 
disagreement, with the IJ’s determination that Sesay was 
credible.  “As a practical matter, therefore, we must proceed 
as if [Sesay’s] testimony were credible and determine 
whether the BIA’s decision is supported by substantial 
evidence in the face of his assumed (but not determined) 
credibility.”  Kayembe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 231, 235 (3d Cir. 
2003).  Regardless, Sesay’s unchallenged credibility is not 
significant to the disposition of our case.  See id. 
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We review the BIA’s legal determinations de novo, 
ordinarily subject to the principles of deference set forth in 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-45 (1984).  Kaplun v. Att’y Gen., 602 
F.3d 260, 265 (3d Cir. 2010).  We do not, however, give 
Chevron deference to unpublished, single-member BIA 
decisions such as the one here.  Mahn v. Att’y Gen., 767 F.3d 
170, 173 (3d Cir. 2014).  At most, we treat those decisions as 
persuasive authority.  Id. (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 
U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). 
IV. Discussion 
A. The Material Support Bar 
The INA prevents an alien from receiving a grant of 
asylum or withholding of removal if that alien has engaged in, 
is engaged in, or is likely to engage in terrorism.  “The INA 
defines [these terms] broadly.”  Haile v. Holder, 658 F.3d 
1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2011).  Engaging in terrorist activities, 
for example, includes “commit[ting] an act that the actor 
knows, or reasonably should know, affords material support . 
. . . to a terrorist organization . . . or to any member of such an 
organization, unless the actor can demonstrate by clear and 
convincing evidence that the actor did not know, and should 
not reasonably have known, that the organization was a 
terrorist organization.”  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI). 
We first considered the meaning of material support in 
Singh-Kaur.  385 F.3d at 298-301.  There, the asylum 
applicant, Singh-Kaur, was a member of a Sikh separatist 
group in India that was “fighting the Indian government,” for 
which he provided food and set up tents at the group’s 
religious meetings.  Id. at 296, 299-301.  We concluded that 
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Singh-Kaur’s actions, even if non-violent and tangential to 
any specific terrorist acts, were sufficient to count as material 
support and thus to render him ineligible for a grant of 
asylum.  Id. at 300-01.  It was enough, we held, that he 
provided general support to a group that had terrorist aims.  
Id. at 301.5   
 Since Singh-Kaur, the BIA and Courts of Appeals 
have repeatedly upheld findings that an alien’s support was 
material, even if it was relatively low-level.  See Bojnoordi v. 
Holder, 757 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 2014) (upholding 
finding of material support because the alien “passed out 
flyers, wrote articles, and trained [a terrorist group’s] 
                                              
5 The Supreme Court has taken a similarly expansive 
view of what constitutes material support in the context of the 
criminal statute banning material support, stating that 
“[m]aterial support meant to promote peaceable, lawful 
conduct can further terrorism by foreign groups in multiple 
ways.” Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 30 
(2010) (internal quotation marks, alteration, and citation 
omitted); id. at 36 (“At bottom, plaintiffs simply disagree 
with the considered judgment of Congress and the Executive 
that providing material support to a designated foreign 
terrorist organization—even seemingly benign support—
bolsters the terrorist activities of that organization.  That 
judgment, however, is entitled to significant weight, and we 
have persuasive evidence before us to sustain it.”); see also 
McAllister, 444 F.3d at 187 (observing that “the INA’s 
definition of ‘terrorist activity’ certainly encompasses more 
conduct than our society, and perhaps even Congress, has 
come to associate with traditional acts of terrorism, e.g., car 
bombs and assassinations”). 
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members on the use of guns in the mountains outside Tehran, 
knowing that this training would further [the terrorist group’s] 
goals”); Viegas v. Holder, 699 F.3d 798, 803 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(upholding finding of material support because the alien “paid 
dues and hung posters” for a terrorist group); Barahona v. 
Holder, 691 F.3d 349, 351-52, 356 (4th Cir. 2012) (upholding 
finding of material support because the alien, under threat, 
allowed terrorists to use his kitchen, gave them directions 
through the jungle, and occasionally allowed them to stay 
overnight); Haile, 658 F.3d at 1129 (upholding finding of 
material support because the alien collected funds, passed 
along secret documents and supplied the terrorist organization 
with sugar, shoes, and cigarettes); Hussain v. Mukasey, 518 
F.3d 534, 538 (7th Cir. 2008) (upholding finding of material 
support because the alien recruited and solicited funds for a 
terrorist group); In Re S-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 936, 945-46 (BIA 
2006) (upholding finding of material support because the 
alien contributed a total of 1,100 Singapore dollars to a 
terrorist group). 
 In the face of this case law, Sesay struggles to explain 
why his actions do not qualify as material support.  His 
argument seems to be that the support he provided was so 
small in size that it was not “material,” pursuant to the plain 
meaning of that word.  See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary 
1124 (10th ed. 2014) (defining material as “[h]aving some 
logical connection with the consequential facts” and “[o]f 
such a nature that knowledge of the item would affect a 
person’s decision-making; significant; essential”).   
The BIA and Courts of Appeals have not squarely 
addressed whether a de minimis exception exists in the 
statute, although the BIA has held in a well-reasoned, not 
precedential opinion that assistance must be more than de 
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minimis in order to give “material” some independent effect.  
See In Re: * * *, 2009 WL 9133770, at *2 (BIA July 10, 
2009) (observing that even if the items taken from the alien, 
including “one packed lunch and the equivalent of about $4 
U.S. dollars, which the terrorists expressly stated would be 
used to buy beer,” constituted “‘support’ for the terrorists, it 
cannot be said to be material”).  We too, have held that 
“material” must be ascribed some meaning.  See Singh-Kaur, 
385 F.3d at 298 (examining Black’s Law Dictionary 
definition of the word).   
We need not define the outer boundaries of materiality 
today, however, because we conclude that Sesay’s actions 
exceeded a de minimis threshold.  That is, if providing food 
and setting up tents at religious meetings constituted material 
support in Singh-Kaur, 385 F.3d at 298-301, then so too does 
carrying weapons and ammunition for a terrorist group during 
a brutally violent conflict.  Accordingly, the IJ and the BIA 
were correct to find that Sesay provided material support to a 
terrorist organization. 
B. A Duress Exception to the Material 
Support Bar 
Sesay did not voluntarily provide material support to a 
terrorist group.  To the contrary, he did so while being 
regularly assaulted and under the threat of death or severe 
bodily harm.  Thus, we must grapple with an issue that our 
Circuit has yet to address: whether involuntary material 
support, even when provided under threat of death, bars an 
alien from receiving asylum or withholding of removal.  We 
conclude that it does. 
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We begin with the plain text of the statute, which does 
not provide for a duress exception to the material support bar.  
See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) (stating that an alien is 
inadmissible if he “commit[s] an act that [he] knows, or 
reasonably should know, affords material support” to a 
terrorist organization).  In isolation, statutory silence may not 
be conclusive.  See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 518 
(2009).  The silence here, however, speaks volumes, given the 
express exception to the material support bar for aliens who 
“demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that [they] did 
not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the 
organization was a terrorist organization.”  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(dd).  Thus, we agree with the 
observation of the Ninth Circuit in addressing this issue:  
“That Congress included this express [knowledge] exception 
within the provision is some indication that it would have 
likewise expressly excepted involuntary support if it intended 
to do so.”  Annachamy v. Holder, 733 F.3d 254, 260 (9th Cir. 
2013), overruled on other grounds by Abdisalan v. Holder, 
774 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 2014). 
Moreover, a neighboring subsection of the statute 
contains an exception precisely for involuntariness.  That 
subsection, the so-called “totalitarian bar,” renders 
inadmissible any alien who “has been a member of or 
affiliated with the Communist or any other totalitarian party 
(or subdivision or affiliate thereof), domestic or foreign,” but 
expressly excepts an alien who demonstrates “that the 
membership or affiliation is or was involuntary.”  8 U.S.C § 
1182(a)(3)(D)(i)-(ii); see also Alturo v. Att’y Gen., 716 F.3d 
1310, 1314 (11th Cir. 2013) (observing that the lack of duress 
exception “stands in marked contrast to a neighboring 
provision in the INA that includes an explicit involuntariness 
14 
exception for aliens who have been affiliated with a 
totalitarian party”); Annachamy, 733 F.3d at 261 (same).  
Thus, the omission of such an exception in § 
1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) is telling, for “the Supreme Court [has] 
observed that ‘[w]here Congress includes particular language 
in one section of a statute but omits it from another, it is 
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and 
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.’”  Shalom 
Pentecostal Church v. Acting Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec., 783 F.3d 156, 165 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Russello v. 
United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)).6   
 Subsequent events also throw Congress’s intent into 
sharp relief.  In 2005, Congress amended the INA to grant the 
Secretaries of State and Homeland Security the “sole 
unreviewable discretion” to waive the material support bar’s 
restrictions in limited circumstances.  Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global 
War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
13, § 104, 119 Stat. 231, 309.  Pursuant to this authority, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security announced that the material 
support bar could be waived for aliens who provided material 
support under duress, pursuant to a number of different 
factors.  See Exercise of Authority Under Section 
                                              
 6 And while the canon is arguably less applicable, 
given that the material support bar and the totalitarian bar 
were enacted by different Congresses, see Singh-Kaur, 385 
F.3d at 299, it is telling that Congress “updated the 
totalitarian party membership provision in the same 
legislation in which it created the material support bar.” 
Annachamy, 733 F.3d at 261 n.7 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing H.R. 
Conf. Rep. No. 101-955, 1990 WL 201613, at § 601). 
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212(d)(3)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 72 
Fed. Reg. 26138-02 (May 8, 2007) (announcing waiver 
scheme for Tier I and II terrorist groups); Exercise of 
Authority Under Section 212(d)(3)(B)(i) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 72 Fed. Reg. 9958–01 (Mar. 6, 2007) 
(announcing waiver scheme for Tier III terrorist groups).   
 Congress reacted quickly to those regulations.  First, it 
expanded the Secretaries’ ability to grant waivers, 
“permit[ting] the Secretar[ies] to waive almost all of the 
terrorism-related bars,” Annachamy, 733 F.3d at 263 n.10, but 
not extending that power to waivers for aliens who 
“voluntarily and knowingly” were members of Tier I or Tier 
II organizations or who “voluntarily and knowingly” provided 
support to those same organizations. 7  See Consolidated 
Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 691(a), 121 
Stat. 1844.  Second, it created a mechanism for the Secretary 
of Homeland Security to report to Congress on the number of 
                                              
 7 Sesay did not apply for a waiver early on for a reason 
that gives us considerable pause.  As the Government 
acknowledged at argument, almost ten years after Congress 
granted the Executive Branch the power to grant waivers, 
there remains no published process for requesting one, 
although as represented by government counsel, numerous 
requests have been granted through ad hoc submissions to 
counsel for the Department of Homeland Security.  See also 
Ay, 743 F.3d at 321 (“At oral argument in the case at bar . . . 
the Government was unable to identify any published process 
for seeking such a waiver.”).  After argument, Sesay’s 
counsel did request a waiver through a letter to opposing 
counsel, but, as he subsequently informed the Court, the 
request was denied. 
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persons subject to removal for providing material support 
under duress.8  See id. at § 691(e).   
Given that the 2007 Amendments discussed duress 
waivers and voluntariness, and required reporting on persons 
removed for having provided material support under duress, 
Congress clearly legislated on the premise that the material 
support bar otherwise applied to support given under duress.  
See Kaymark v. Bank of Am., N.A., 783 F.3d 168, 176-77 (3d 
Cir. 2015) (observing that subsequent Congressional 
amendments to a statute provide insight on Congressional 
intent to the statute generally); Annachamy, 733 F.3d at 262 
n.8 (“Although the waiver provision was not enacted until 15 
years after the creation of the material support bar, the waiver 
provision is still relevant in determining the earlier 
congressional intent.”).  To read the statute in any other way 
would make Congress’s reporting requirement meaningless 
and would contravene unambiguous legislative intent.     
In sum, Congress has “delegat[ed] to the Secretary the 
sole authority to waive the applicability of terrorist-related 
bars, . . . has paid specific attention to duress waivers,” and 
“has appreciated the distinction between voluntary and 
                                              
 8 In recent years, the Secretaries of State and 
Homeland Security have continued to expand the categories 
of activities eligible for waiver.  See Exercise of Authority 
Under Section 212(d)(3)(B)(i) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 6914-01 (Feb. 5, 2014) 
(creating waiver authority for aliens who provided “limited 
material support” under “substantial pressure that does not 
rise to the level of duress”). 
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involuntary conduct.”  Annachamy, 733 F.3d at 263-64.9  
Thus, absent a waiver from the Executive Branch, the INA 
precludes asylum or withholding of removal for any alien 
who provided material support, voluntarily or involuntarily.  
* * *  
We recognize the harsh consequence of our holding, 
but it is compelled by policy decisions that reside with 
Congress and the Executive Branch.  See Humanitarian Law 
Project, 561 U.S. at 33-34 (stating that the Judiciary must 
often defer to Congress when considering legislation dealing 
with the “sensitive and weighty interests of national security 
                                              
 9 Our conclusion is squarely in line with the Fourth 
Circuit, Barahona, 691 F.3d at 353-56, the Ninth Circuit, 
Annachamy, 733 F.3d at 260-66, and the Eleventh Circuit, 
Alturo, 716 F.3d at 1314.  The only court to have veered 
somewhat from this path is the Second Circuit, which did not 
reach a conclusion on the issue and instead remanded to the 
BIA to issue a precedential decision on the matter.  Ay v. 
Holder, 743 F.3d 317, 320-21 (2d Cir. 2014).  In a series of 
not precedential opinions following Ay, the Second Circuit 
has continued to remand for the same reason.  See Gurung v. 
Holder, 591 F. App’x 16, 18 (2d Cir. 2014); Hernandez v. 
Holder, 579 F. App’x 12, 15 (2d Cir. 2014); Ayvaz v. Holder, 
564 F. App’x 625, 628 (2d Cir. 2014).  We decline to take the 
Second Circuit’s approach, for while we accord Chevron 
deference to the BIA’s interpretations of ambiguity in the 
INA, Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 551 (3d Cir. 2001), 
we have no need to await a precedential decision from the 
BIA when the issue is one of unambiguous statutory 
interpretation. 
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and foreign affairs”).  Accordingly, we join with our sister 
Courts of Appeals and conclude that the material support bar 
does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary 
support.  The BIA correctly held that Sesay is ineligible for 
asylum or withholding of removal for having provided 
material support to a terrorist group, and his petition for 
review therefore will be denied. 
